GMA News Online - Winnie Monsod Blog

The impact of the Webb decision

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-12-21T11:17:18Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on December 17, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

Last week, we looked at some of the arguments for and against the acquittal of Hubert Webb and others of the “Vizconde Massacre” and said that it boiled down to whether we believed the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses headed by Jessica Alfaro, or the testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense witnesses presented by Webb et al. including official documents from the Philippine and United States governments.

Three days ago, the decision of the Supreme Court (SC) – by a vote of seven to four, with four justices inhibiting themselves – was to acquit Webb and his co-accused, who are now all free. The decision has raised even more questions, which we will now try to analyze and answer.

Q1. Does the decision mean that justice is only for the rich? This is the accusation of Lauro Vizconde, widower and surviving father of the victims. Apparently, the basis of his accusation is that the accused (the convicts later acquitted) are, for the most part, wealthy – except for Gerardo Biong, who was a policeman – or at least definitely not poor, and that there was "bayaran" in the case, in other words, they bought the favorable decision (of acquittal).

A1. I cannot speak for all the SC justices who were part of either the voting majority or the minority. But there are two justices whose integrity I can vouch for: Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, who both not only voted for acquittal, but also wrote a concurring opinion and a separate concurring opinion, respectively.

But other than that, Vizconde's charge does not seem to be supported by the history of the case, because if money could really buy the decision in this case, why were these wealthy people in jail for 15 years?

By the way, all over the world, the contention that “justice is only for the rich” is accepted almost all over the world in another sense than that which Vizconde uses it: the sense that except for “pro bono” cases where legal services are done for free, only the rich can afford the best lawyers. In that sense, one can say that had Webb not gotten the best lawyers, he and his co-accused (fellow convicts in the Vizconde case) would still be rotting in jail.

Q2. Does the decision of the Supreme Court, as headlined in the media, imply that Webb and his co-accused may not be innocent?

A2. Unang-una, kailangan natin maintindihan na dalawa lang ang (First of all, we should understand that there are only two possible) verdicts that can be pronounced by any court of law, whether in the Philippines or abroad: either Guilty or Not Guilty. No court in the world will rule or pronounce a person innocent.

At totoo din na pwede na (Keep in mind that) a court may pronounce a defendant “not guilty” even if the defendant actually committed a crime. For example, nag-confess na ang akusado, pero hindi inadmit ng korte, for some reason or another, ang confession na iyan. Pero dito sa kaso na ito, kung basahin lamang ang decision ng Korte, halatang-halata kung ano ang iniisip nila. Tungkol sa kung kapani-paniwala ang testimony ni Jessica Alfaro, inexplain ni J. Roberto Abad, ponente ng decision, na para maging kapani-paniwala ang testimony ng isang witness, kailangan dalawang criteria must be met: isa ay na ang witness ay credible, meaning to say na basehan sa experience sa kanya, she can be trusted to tell the truth. At ikalawa, kailang ang istorya niya ay also kapani-paniwala, hindi pwersado, at walang mga inconsistencies. Diniscuss ito ni Abad sa kanyang ponensiya, at sabi niya:

(For example, the accused makes a confession but this was not admitted into evidence by the court for some reason or another. But if you read the SC decision in the Vizconde case, it is quite clear how the justices appreciated the facts. As regards the credibility of the testimony of Jessica Alfaro, the ponente of the decision, Justice Roberto Abad, explained that for witness testimony to be believable it must meet two criteria – first, that the witness herself should credible, meaning to say based on previous experience with her, she can be trusted to tell the truth; secondly, her narration of the events must also be believable, not under duress, and free from inconsistencies. Abad discussed this in his ponencia, where he said:)

“Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.”

Ang tanong pa ni Abad (He also asked): “Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?”

Si Justice Conchita Carpio Morales naman, ang sabi ay hindi niya maintindihan kung bakit tinanggap at hindi pinagsuspetsahan ng lower courts yung testimony ni Alfaro. Tungkol naman kay Webb, ito ang sabi niya (For her part, Justice Carpio Morales said she could not understand how the lower courts could accept without suspicion Alfaro’s testimony. As for Webb, she had this to say):

“His travel and immigration documents showing his departure from the Philippines and arrival in the U.S.A., not to mention the testimonial and documentary evidence on his activities while in the U.S.A. between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, deserve full credit. If half the world away could not even be considered to be ‘so far removed from the crime scene’ as to evince the physical impossibility of actual presence, then the defense of alibi can only be appreciated when an accused lands in a different planet."

O ano, mga kapuso, sa palagay niyo ba, basehan sa sinabi ng Korte Suprema, na pwedeng guilty sina Webb? (Do you think – based on what the Supreme Court had said – Webb et al. are guilty?)

Q3. May impact ba ang Webb decision sa justice system natin? (Does the Webb decision have an impact on the Philippine justice system?)

A3. Doon sa separate concurring opinion ni Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, nilista niya ang maraming examples of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct doon sa kaso ni Webb, that according to her, violated the rights of the accused – suppressing evidence, mishandling evidence, not preserving evidence. Sa palagay ko, hindi lang yan problema sa kaso ni Webb, kundi sakit yan talaga ng ating judicial system na dapat magamot na – lalo na itong practice na paggamit ng mga police o NBI assets na maging testigo. Sana mapakinggan natin ang sinabi ni Justice Sereno – kasi habang hindi natin maggamot ag mga practices na ito, the miscarriage of justice will continue to be the rule rather than the exception.

(In her separate concurring opinion, Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno listed down numerous examples of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct committed in Webb’s criminal case, that according to her, violated the rights of the accused – suppressing evidence, mishandling evidence, and not preserving evidence. In my view, these problems do not only plague the case of Webb, but rather these are endemic in our judicial system and must be purged – particularly this practice of using police or NBI assets as witnesses. Let the advice of Justice Sereno be heard – because as long as we do not do away with these bad practices, the miscarriage of justice will continue to be the rule rather than the exception.)

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Oil price hike: due to world market prices or the pipeline leak?

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-11-22T05:07:36Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on November 18, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

Marami ang nagtatanong: Ito bang latest oil price hike ay may kinalaman sa pagsasara ng FPIC pipeline at kakulangan ng supply lalo na sa Metro Manila?

You know what my usual answer is: let's do the arithmetic.

May tinatawag na rule of thumb to compute how the changes in the international prices of petroleum products can be translated into domestic price changes.

Ayon sa oil monitor ng DOE, tumaas nga ang presyo last week ng mga petroleum oil products from their prices two weeks ago.

Gasoline went up by more than $3 a barrel, and diesel by more than $5 a barrel.

Mas specific ang datos na nakuha ho ko based on my independent research.

Diesel prices last week actually went up by $5.176 a barrel from their prices two weeks ago, and gasoline went up by $3.381 per barrel. Kerosene by $4.617 per barrel.

Okay. Ano ang rule of thumb na ginagamit ng mga major players like Shell?

Simple lang.

Step 1: Start with the increase or decrease in the international price between last week and two weeks ago. That is quoted in $/barrel.

Step 2: Multiply that by the average peso-dollar exchange rate for last week, to get the Peso/Barrel equivalent of the price change.

Step 3: To get the Peso /Liter increase, we divide the Peso/Barrel change by 159, because there are 159 liters in a barrel.

Step 4: We then multiply this by 1.12 to get the equivalent increase inclusive of VAT, which is 12%.

Gawin natin ngayon ito para sa diesel: $5.176 per barrel times P43.442 divided by 159 times 1.12 equals P1.58 per liter.

Para sa Kerosene: $4.4617 times P43.442 divided by 159 times 1.12 equals P1.365 per liter.

Para sa Gasoline: $3.381 times P43.442 divided by 159 times 1.12 = P1.03 per liter.

Mag-add tayo ng 6 centavos per liter for transportation cost, which makes the indicated price increase to be:

Diesel: P1.64

Kerosene: P1.42

Gasoline : P1.09

Ngayon, let us compare that with the announced price increases:

Ang unang nag-announce na tataas ang presyo starting Tuesday at 12:01am was Pilipinas Shell.

Shell increased diesel and kerosene prices by P2 per liter,and gasoline prices by P1.50 a liter.

I -side by side natin po :

For Diesel -- the Actual Price Increase is 2 pesos; the rule of thumb computation is one peso and sixty four centavos.

For Kerosene -- the actual price increase is 2 pesos; the rule of thumb is one peso and forty-two centavos.

For Gasoline -- the actual price increase is 1 peso and fifty centavos; the rule of thumb is one peso and nine centavos.

Ano ang conclusion natin: The price increases of the oil companies are obviously greater than what would be indicated by the changes in international prices of petroleum products, hindi po ba?

Which means that these domestic price increases must reflect also -- at least for Shell and Chevron, their increased costs due to the closing of the pipeline, not to mention the shortages, because not enough products can be transported through the alternative methods being used by Shell and Chevron.

Unfortunately, it looks like the rest of the industry, are benefiting from this situation, because they are matching the prices of Shell and Chevron.

Nakikigaya na lang ang iba, which means ang laki ng profit nila, hindi po ba?

Ang pinagdidiinan naman ng mga kumpanya ng langis -- walang kinalaman ang pipeline leak sa oil price hike.

Base sa ating komputasyon... kayo na ang humusga.

Tandaan, maging mapanuri, kilatisin ang mga isyu, ako po si Winnie Monsod on Q.

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Bus coding

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-11-18T07:08:25Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on November 17, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

The Bus Operators who were involved in that lightning bus strike on Monday should be shown the full force of the law. I agree.

Their perfidy, the deceitfulness that marked that strike, makes their actions even more contemptible. I agree.

But if we think that the so-called Unified Vehicular Volume Reduction Program or UVVRP, also known as the number coding system, will be a major contributor to solving our traffic problems, let us disabuse ourselves.

Let the numbers speak for themselves: “EDSA can physically accommodate up to 1,600 buses. But 3,800 city-franchised buses currently ply EDSA”. This from the MMDA itself, quoting from a study conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

We have to add to that the number of colorum buses, or those which have no legal franchise to operate. And here, from the MMDA (August 5, 2010), we are talking about another 2,200 buses, because “...at least 6,000 buses pass through Edsa and other major roads every day, a considerable number of which are colorum”.

So, doing the arithmetic, the UVVRP, if implemented successfully, will reduce the amount of buses by 1,200 a day, which still leaves 4,800 buses moving up and down EDSA, still three times EDSA’s carrying capacity.

Now then, let us suppose that the MMDA is 100% successful in its anti-colorum program, meaning to say, it manages to remove the estimated non-franchised buses from the road. That will still leave, with the 20% UVVRP coding, 3,800 minus 20% or 3,140 franchised buses plying the streets, or almost double the capacity of EDSA to carry.

But unfortunately, we cannot assume a 100% successful anti-colorum program – because from the recent experience in August, the MMDA was only able to round up 117 vehicles –which included not only buses but taxis and AUVs – in the first day, another 76 in the second day, and then one or two a day for the next fifteen days in August. After that, there are no more news reports.

And in the meantime, we must expect a sudden surge in the demand for fake license plates.

Given all the foregoing, I think it is safe to say that the UVVRP, as an answer to Metro Manila’s traffic problems, is sadly wanting. It may not be worth the effort of putting out 1,800 enforcers, as MMDA has fielded.

Fortunately, there is a better solution – in the sense that the cost-benefit ratio is much higher, that apparently has the approval and cooperation of the bus operators, and one that MMDA already has in its arsenal.

What is that? I suggest that Chairman or Secretary Tolentino resurrect and put the final touches on the project that his predecessor Bayani Fernando was working on and had been working on for three years, and had almost completed before he resigned to run for national office.

I don’t know its name, but its main objective is to rationalize the entire bus transport system in Metro Manila. The MMDA will take over the bus dispatching activities, using the latest technology which includes Radio Frequency Identification that will allow it to identify and track the movement of every single bus in the system and ensure the proper scheduling and smooth timetables for the various routes.

As Chairman Fernando explained to me, the project has seven bus terminals around Metro Manila, with almost half of these built by private investors – such as the one in Alabang which was put up by Filinvest, one in Malabon put up by the Oretas, and another one in Fairview.

As explained to me, the project hoped to achieve the following:
1. bus riders will know, as they do in bus transport systems abroad, the schedules and routes of the buses they will take.
2. because of non-duplication, buses are assured of a load factor of 60% (where currently, 30% is the norm).
3. which means that buses can accomplish their objectives with four trips rather than five or more.
4. which further means that there will be less pollution, not only because there will be less buses plying the routes at any given time, but that there will be less waiting time and pollution time as buses try to increase their load.

Former Chairman Fernando has informed me that all the equipment were in place when he left, all the systems were ready to go. Plus he tells me the World Bank was ready to give the MMDA P50 million a year in so-called carbon credits because of the reduction in pollution.

Now, the big question is: How come it wasn't pursued when Fernando left? Dinky Soliman had the good sense to continue and expand what her predecessor, Espy Cabral started, because it is a good project. Let us hope that MMDA Chairman Francis Tolentino has the same good sense.

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The pipeline leak -- protagonists, timeline, accountability

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-11-06T03:11:05Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on November 4, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

Main protagonists in Makati fuel leak incident
1. West Tower (WT) - Condominium in Barangkay Bangkal
2. City of Makati (City) - office of the Mayor, City Engineer, etc.
3. First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) - owners of the sole commercial private pipeline in the Philippines, completed in 1969, which transports fuel and petroleum products from Batangas to Sucat and Pandacan, Manila
4. National Institute of Geological Sciencies (NIGS) - headed by Dr. Carlos Arcilla through GeoScience Foundation

Time Line:

July 28, 1976: FPIC sends a letter to DPWH Secretary Baltazar Aquino, to the effect that substantial portions of the 14-inch pipeline will be affected by the then proposed overpass (SLEX) project - 110 meters of the pipeline will be affected by the project's retaining wall.

Comment: No reply

May, 2010: a resident of Capinpin St. in Barangay Bangkal detects the smell of gas or noxious fumes emanating from his deepwell. Tells City.

Comment: Nothing done.

July 9, 2010: WT residents detect smell of fuel fumes in the basement, stairwells, lobby and finally living areas of the condominium - traced to cracks in basement wall and in sump pit in the lowest basement (Basement Level 4).

July 12, 2010: FPIC digs up area of pipeline in front of WT to determine if there are leaks. Results are negative. City asks FPIC to dig 13 "Test Pits" (1.5 m diameter, 2m deep) parallel to pipeline along Bonifacio St to determine presence of gas and/or petroleum products. Tests turn out negative for the soil samples, but positive for water samples.

Comment: FPIC stopped pipeline deliveries from July 12-14, and from July 21-24 to allow for the tests.

July 21, 2010: Noxious smells stronger in WT. City orders WT residents to vacate, cut off electricity, and shut down sump pumps used to pump water from basement into city drains when water in sump pit exceeds a specified level.

Comment: City says WT is told to siphon off expected water buildup from basement using alternative methods to pumping. WT says City informally suggests that they use the pump at night when nobody is looking, but WT demurs. And cannot find the proper contractor.

Result: water build up (with fuel on top) floods basements 4 and 3.

July 27, 2010 press release/news report comes out with following:
1. Flooding of WT basement prevents authorities from determining cause of leak. WT given seven days to siphon out water, or else.
2. City Engineer also "rules out the FPIC pipeline as source of the gas leak leaving the basement of the condominium as the only area not thoroughly investigated"
3. Mayor Binay approved a proposal to:
(a) hire a private company to check for presence of pe,troleum products in water samples from Capinpin St where residents had complained of fumes as early as May;
(b) soil boring tests in the area conducted to locate the presence of petroleum products and the source of the leak.

Comment: It takes WT 39 days and P7 million to execute this order (fuel must be separated from water before water can be discharged into city drains). In the process 8-11 drums of fuel a day are collected from the water at 200 liters per drum or anywhere from 1,600 to 2,200 liters a day of - in separate batches -- gasoline, diesel and kerosene- and in the past two days, the amount had gone up to 14 drums. Furthermore, the proposals approved by Mayor Binay were not carried out, until two months later.

August 9, 2010: In a meeting between WT and Mayor Binay in the Mayor's office, City tells WT that FPIC is not the source of the leak - based on the FPIC letter regarding the findings of the diggings and Test Pits.

Comment: The working hypotheses of the City, at this point, is that WT is the source of the leak - the speculation being that WT has drums of diesel buried under basement 4 for emergency purposes, and that these were the ones leaking. WT claims it has nothing buried underground. What it had was a tank for its genset that had 2.5 drums of diesel, plus another three full drums for reserve. At 200 liters per drum, we are talking about 1,100 liters of diesel in basement 4.

Sept 7, 2010: WT informs City and DENR that basement water is now confined to sump pit, but fuel continues to leak into basement.

Comment: remember that WT still does not use sump pump, but gets an outsider to separate fuel from water so that the water can be drained.

Sept. 13, 2010: Inspection team -- composed of various City agency, DENR and DOE representatives -- verify that WT can be eliminated as source of leak. City still wants to check on gasoline stations and car and motor repair shops in the area as possible sources.

Comment: Which of course doesn't make sense. Gasoline stations that would lose 1,600-2,200 liters a day would soon be out of business, and would at least try to find out how they were losing that much. Repair shops don't use that volume of kerosene. On the other hand, the pipeline transports over 8 million liters a day of a mixture of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel.

Sept. 20, 2010: FPIC hires two separate firms to conduct "Ground Penetration Radar Scans " (GPRS) tests. GPRS tests are "not definitive" but may "point to some possible areas for further examination. Results, upon further examination, included an underground object that had the dimensions of a storage tank, were negative.

October 15, 2010: The results of another test - part of FPIC's quinquennial pipeline integrity check, are submitted to City. This test, conducted by the independent contractor NDT Middle East, (at a cost of $2 million), used the most modern and universally accepted magnetic flux and ultrasonic technologies.

Findings: There are "no metal loss areas that would indicate any leaks are present."

Comment: Faced with an impossible situation, that neither WT nor FPIC are the sources of the leak, City finally brings in the marines by sending a letter to President Emerlinda Roman of the University of the Philippines, who assigns Director Carlos Arcilla of the National Insitute of Geological Science (NIGS) to conduct an independent review.

Even without a written contract, Arcilla and his team of geologists swing into action. Arcilla quickly realizes that given the volume of fuel that has been leaked, given the pattern of the leakages - alternately gasoline, diesel and kerosene that mimic the pattern of what is transported in the pipeline, it cannot be anything but the pipeline. He and his team bore holes, along the pipeline and use "explosimeters" to measure the extent of explosiveness of the fumes that may be found.

October 28, 2010: Early morning - in an area of the pipeline directly under the ramp of the flyover, the dig shows a strong stream of gasoline gushing out. All doubts are erased. The pipeline is the source of the leak.

Comment: The extent of the leak has not yet been determined. The work is hampered by the fact that the leak seems to be right under the flyover - which, 34 years ago, FPIC warned the Marcos government about.

With the benefit of hindsight, here is what happened to the protagonists: we see that the Makati City Government seems to have drawn the wrong conclusions too early in the game; and that it did not implement until almost three months later, the proposal approved by Mayor Binay to get an independent contractor to do the tests.

The West Tower allowed the water to flood their basements, the siphoning out of which wasted 39 days; FPIC believed their digging and their hi-tech tests, and refused to realize the significance of the volume and the pattern of the fuel leaks - until faced with the evidence of gasoline gushing out of the hole bored by the NIGS Team.

NIGS must be congratulated - because they came in even without a contract signed, realizing how large the stakes were. I understand that Dr. Arcilla used his own money to purchase those crucial explosimeters. Arcilla does UP proud. Honor and Excellence.

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A troubling verdict

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-04-06T05:58:49Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on March 31 , 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

There has been a great uproar following the Supreme Court decision on midnight appointments.

To understand the issue, let us first look at what our Constitution has to say about these appointments.

We find it in Section 15 of Article VII of the Constitution states: "Two months immediately before the next Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public-service or endanger public safety."

I invite the viewer to look at the Constitutional provision again. Where in that provision does it say: "except appointments to the judiciary" or "appointments to the Supreme Court."

Another curiosity here is that this Supreme Court not only overturned a previous unanimous Supreme Court decision promulgated in 1998, on exactly the same issue of midnight appointments to the judiciary.

That overturned decision was, by the way, an opinion shared by three justices who would become future Chief Justices (Davide, Panganiban, and Puno).

But this Supreme Court pronounced that previous decision "deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable." Can you imagine that?

Anyway, suffice it to say that the lone dissenter, Supreme Court Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, in an opinion which tore into shreds the arguments and rationalizations of the majority, concluded that such arguments had "the weight of helium," meaning to say, they were lighter than air.

Why is there such an uproar about this particular Supreme Court decision?

From what I can gather, there are two streams of thought on the matter.

One stream of thought takes the decision to be just one piece or just one part of a deliberate, unholy conspiracy that will result in a holdover presidency.

As basis for this doomsday scenario opinion, they point out to the following:

the shuffling or reassignment last January 10 of all the PNP station commanders all over the Philippines;
the delays in the Comelec automation plan; moreover, some of the original safety features in the machines have been removed, all of which supposedly point to a massive breakdown during elections with enough voters effectively disenfranchised that the outcome of the elections will be in doubt;
The appointment of an AFP Chief of Staff close to President, so that the Armed Forces will either be looking the other way or encouraging the chaos, while the PNP reassignees will be taking orders from the DILG.

So where does the Supreme Court enter this complicated picture?

Well they say, someone is sure to go to the Supreme Court to seek relief.

At which point, it is said, the Supreme Court, having read into the Constitution something that is not there, in the midnight case will find it just as easy to declare that there was something wrong with the election of the Senate President who constitutionally must take over to oversee the next elections; and therefore declare that they had no choice but to allow a holdover presidency, because the alternative might be a military takeover.

The question, of course is: why should the midnight appointment of a Chief Justice be a major factor in the conspiracy theory?

The Chief Justice, after all is only one of fifteen Supreme Court Justices — all he can do is try to exercise intellectual leadership over his brethren.

In other words, the midnight appointments decision cannot really be considered part of such a conspiracy. So, that's one stream of thought.

The other stream of thought, while it does not hold to a conspiracy theory, has an opinion that is equally if not more chilling. What this Supreme Court decision does is highlight:

a very dangerous tendency of the Supreme Court to read into the Constitution something that is not there, putting words as it were, into the Constitution's mouth , so that it in effect emasculates the Constitution, or exploits the Constitution for its own ends; and
the sloppiness of its research (or its reasoning), accompanied by the misplaced, arrogant courage of their ignorance which unfortunately they consider to be intellectual superiority.

Whichever stream of thought is correct, the country is in terrible trouble.

Why the big fuss about condoms?

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-03-24T05:38:10Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on March 22 , 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

HIV/AIDS data gathered by the DOH National Epidemiology Center and published monthly in the Philippine HIV and AIDS Registry show that between 2001 and 2009, the number of new cases of HIV/AIDS reported almost quintupled: 174 in 2001 and 835 in 2009.

But it was not a steady growth rate.

Between 2001 and 2005 the reported number of infections grew by only 21 percent over the four year period.

But in the next four years — between 2005 and 2009 — it almost quadrupled (from 210 to 835).

Not only that, the number of cases reported in January 2010, just 2 months ago 143, was more than double (2.2 times) the preceding January's 65.

Are these data reflective of what is going on globally? The answer is NO.

Because globally, the number of reported new HIV/AIDS did not rise, but fell by 17 percent.

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In other words, where the rest of the world shows declining new cases, the Philippines is increasing figuratively by leaps and bounds which is probably the basis of Health Secretary Cabral's worry.

And which should be cause for worry for the rest of us too.

Let's go to the condom effectiveness issue.

Are they effective in preventing HIV/AIDS?

The answer is Yes, if we listen to the WHO study circa 2000 and the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health study circa 1999.

Why are there no studies which are more recent?

Apparently because the issue of condom effectiveness has been resolved all that long ago.

Maybe there are other countries than the Philippines where questions are being asked, but I couldn't find any.

The WHO Fact Sheet No. 243 states: "Laboratory studies have found that viruses (including HIV) do not pass through intact latex condoms even when the devices are stretched or stressed…. "

In Thailand, the promotion by the government of 100 percent condom use by commercial sex workers led to a dramatic increase in the use of condoms (from 14 percent in 1990 to 94 percent in 1994); an equally dramatic decline in STD cases (from 410,406 cases in 1987 to 27,362 cases in 1994. )

Studies undertaken on serodiscordant couples, when one partner is infected with HIV and the other is not….well they show that, with consistent condom use, the HIV infection rate among uninfected partners was less than one percent per year, of course, inconsistent condom use can be as risky as not using condoms at all.

The Johns Hopkins is more of the same (and probably one source of the WHO fact sheet): "Condoms provide highly effective protection against HIV infection when used correctly with every act of intercourse. All 10 cohort studies conducted through 1995 that evaluated condom use among heterosexual couples showed that consistent condom use protected against HIV."

The caveat in all this is that the condoms should be used consistently and correctly, and that the condoms must be of good quality.

But, as Johns Hopkins says, "Still, some use is better than none,” and "Narrowing the gap between condom need and use is a major public health challenge….Efforts to increase condom use are a good social, economic, and health investment."

But, according to our Catholic prelates, definitely a bad moral/religious move.

The question therefore is: will the beneficial social, economic and health aspects outweigh the disadvantageous moral/religious aspects, or will it be vice versa?

Or maybe we should rephrase that question so that it really gets down to the nitty-gritty.

Will the healthy wives or husbands of those who have AIDS practice abstinence for the rest of their lives, or will they use condoms and jeopardize their immortal soul?

What would you do?

What's up with the Comelec's Second Division?

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-02-24T12:44:20Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on Feb. 22, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

That Comelec is the center of attention at this time is not surprising. The May elections are fast approaching.

But the nature of that attention is another matter altogether, focused as it is on the credibility of the Comelec as an institution.

A joint House-Senate Committee chaired by Chiz Escudero and TeddyBoy Locsin has been showing concern about the Comelec's ability to handle an automated election .

In particular, the problem of delays in the Comelec's schedule — delivery delays, training delays, deployment delays, the problem of security, and the obvious lack of a back-up or contingency plan that can be activated in case something goes wrong with the machines, or something is shown to be wrong with those machines, these all have been haunting Comelec officials as well as our legislators — who got cold feet after appropriating P11 billion for Comelec's activities.

But that is not the only reason why attention is focused on the Comelec.

Quite apart from the problems of automation, there is the problem also of the Comelec decisions with regard to election protests, particularly those emanating from the Second Division, which for quite some time now has been the subject of rumors and speculation, and has gained notoriety among election lawyers.

This Second Division, composed of Nicodemo Ferrer as head, and Elios Yusoph and Lucenito Tagle as members, have handed down three very controversial decisions in which incumbent governors have been declared losers and asked to step down from their positions: the governors of Bulacan, Isabela and Pampanga.

What has captured the public's attention is not that a decision was made — resolving election protests are after all a primary responsibility of the Comelec.

It is not even suprising anymore that the length of time that it takes the Comelec to make a decision is almost the length of time of the term of office of the contested position — which is three years for every office except those of Senators, and the President and Vice President.

Rather, what has captured the public's attention, and possibly outrage, are the identities of those who, in effect, have been accused of cheating.

Yes, let's call a spade a spade here.

Because when someone is unseated, the default scenario is that he must have cheated to win in the first place. Or to look at it from another point of view, declaring someone a winner three years after elections took place is practically the same thing as saying that that person had been cheated, and the Comelec is just making things right.

The only problem is that in at least the Isabela and Pampanga cases, the public is incredulous about the implication of cheating on the part of the sitting governors, and instead suspects foul play on the part of, or with the consent of, the Comelec's Second Division.

Let's take a closer look at two of the cases, involving the provinces of Isabela and Pampanga.

Who were in effect found to have cheated? Grace Padaca in Isabela, and Ed Panlilio in Pampanga.

One was a radio commentator, the other a priest.

Neither of them have money, neither of them had political machinery — both of them were novatos — new to the political world.

And to cheat successfully in the Philippines, as we saw in a recent analysis, you need guns and goons, or gold. You need private armies, or you need the money to bribe either voters or counters.

Neither of which neither Padaca nor Panlilio had. They had volunteers who gave of their time and effort to help.

And yet, what did the Comelec's second division find?

In the case of Padaca, the Comelec managed to find enough evidence of cheating to overcome the 17,000 vote lead of Padaca, and make her opponent win 1,051 votes. That takes some doing, and it took Comelec 12,000 pages to do it, including, in some parts of the decision, referring to Padaca as Sarmiento, and to her opponent Dy as Tuazon.

In the case of Panlilio, not only did the Comelec's second division turn down his request for more time to raise funds for paying the costs of the case, but they seemed to have a strong desire to speed up the counting by allowing twenty teams of revisors at the same time instead of only the usual nine — and of course, that required even more funding than the usual.

Thus, Panlilio was left with only one revisor for every three that his opponent had — with the blessings of the Comelec's Second Division, who scoffed at Panlilio's plea, and asked him to use the "volunteers" he claimed to have had.

But there also seems to be more overt bias on the part of the Comelec Second Division.

Such as in the Isabela case, the name Faustino Dy was credited to Benjamin Dy for governor, while the names Gris Padaca or Grace Padacca, with a double c, was not credited to Padaca.

In the Pampanga case, the name Nanay Baby was credited to Panlilio's rival, but the names Ed and Among were not allowed to be credited to Panlilio.

And that's how Panlilio's slim lead of over a thousand votes vanished, and his rival won instead by over 2,000 votes.

With that kind of decision-making process going on in Comelec, is it any wonder that it is fast losing whatever credibility it had?

For shame.

Private armies and free elections

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-02-11T06:49:23Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment “Analysis by Winnie Monsod” which aired on News on Q on February 8, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 PM on Channel 11.)

As we draw nearer to election day, so many issues are cropping up that catch the public's attention – particularly those dealing with the success or failure of automated elections.

Let us make sure, however, that we do not miss the forest for the trees.

As Article II, Section 1 of our Constitution says, sovereignty resides in the people, and all government authority emanates from them.

This sovereignty is exercised by means of suffrage – which is the right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote for their national and local officials, as well as in the decision of public questions submitted to them.

The election involves voting and then counting (and canvassing), and if these two procedures go well, then, the people's choice will indeed come out.

But there is a problem.

Even as the people express their will through the ballot, that expression can – and has been –subverted many times.

When and how can this subversion take place?

At two points during the election process: During the voting, and during the counting/canvassing, that's when.

And how? The expression “guns, goons, and gold” says it all.

The subversion can be accomplished either by force – "guns and goons"; or by bribery – "gold"; or some combination of both.

The guns and goons are the private armies, which have been part of the Philippine scene for at least the past 60 years, and have figured tragically and prominently in elections.

What else do we know about private armies?

1. They operate with the blessings, or the active participation of military and police elements, which in turn may be because of the explicit or implicit blessings of Malacañang.

Take the case of Negros Occidental governor Rafael Lacson, circa 1951, who reputedly had a 1,000-man private army and claimed closeness to the President Elpidio Quirino, claiming to have been instrumental in quirino's election.

Governor Lacson was enraged when a guerilla fighter, Moises Padilla defied him and ran for mayor.

Even though Padilla lost the election, he was arrested on trumped-up charges, beaten, tortured, and paraded around the towns of Negros Occidental as an object lesson of what happens when you defy the governor, and then he was shot.

That is eerily similar to the case, almost 60 years later, of Maguindanao Governor Andal Ampatuan, who claimed closeness to Malacañang, who reputedly has at least a 1000-man private army with control over the police, who was indeed instrumental in the election of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Presidency, and who was displeased because Toto Mangudadatu defied him and filed his certificate of candidacy to run for governor.

That's how the maguindanao massacre took place.

2. Poverty and private armies seem to go hand in hand – the poorer the area, the larger the number and the size of the private armies.

Take the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

It is the region with the highest incidence of poverty in the Philippines, and probably the lowest human development index.

The latest military and police report states that of an estimated 170 private armies all over the Philippines, 102 (60 percent) are located in ARMM.

3. There seems to be if not active cooperation, at least complicity by the police and military when it comes to private armies.

In the Moises Padilla case, Governor Lacson's co-defendants included three police chiefs, several policemen, and some special policemen. And of course, also in Maguindanao.

4. Indeed private armies can be dismantled – but it requires determination, like that showed by President Ramon Magsaysay and President Cory Aquino.

In fact, between 1993 and today, it would seem that the number of private armies has decreased from 562 to 170 or 132, depending on whether we accept the Army’s or [Defense Secretary] Bert Gonzales’ figures.

But the size of private armies, however, seems to have increased – from an average of about 43 to an average of 76.

If these armies are not dismantled, not even a perfectly operating automated election system can guarantee that the sovereign will of the people in their choice of leaders from the president to the lowest local officials will be obeyed.

The guns and goons operating in certain areas may be sufficient to change the real vote of the people.

In sum, we have to be vigilant with respect to automated elections.

But, we must also demand that the army and the police dismantle these private armies if our elections are going to be truly free.

Everything you wanted to know about the C5 project but were afraid to ask

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-02-02T09:55:13Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment “Analysis by Winnie Monsod” which aired on News on Q on Feb. 1, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on QTV Channel 11.)

What are the specific charges against Senator Manny Villar?

Based on the Senate Report 780, stripped of all the legalese, the charges are that he used his position and influence to cause a government roadway — the so-called C-5 road extension project — to be built and that the road was unnecessary, financially disadvantageous to the government, and would actually yield him enormous financial benefits.

It was unnecessary, because there was already an existing project, the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway (MCTEP), which was a Build-Operate-Transfer project to be built by private contractors.

It was financially disadvantageous to the government because the Villar-proposed project would be longer and would be built entirely by the government using public funds.

And it would result in tremendous financial benefit for Villar because it would pass right through his properties so that the government would have to pay him road right-of-way and at the same time, considerably enhance the value of those properties.

What exacerbates the situation is that the government, per the documentary evidence, paid much more for the right-of-way for the Villar properties than the other properties, that Villar allegedly used his position as a senator — in particular as the Senate Finance Chairman and then as Senate President — to make insertions that would ensure that his properties would be paid for right away.

Based on the Philippine Senate resolution 1472 filed by mostly Villar allies, the committee of the whole had no jurisdiction, that it adopted rules that were inapplicable, that it did not even publish the final rules, that there was an inadequate quorum reuirement; and most importantly, that Manny Villar was being singled out.

What does it then find?

Resolution 1472 finds that:

(1) there was no “double insertion” and that the same were actually “regular amendments”;

(2) that there is no realignment of the C-5 road extension project, much less one authored or done at the behest of senator Villar to secure that it passed through his real estate properties.

Why? Because there are two separate alignments: one is the C-5 road extension project, which is a public road; and the other is the MCTEP, a toll expressway project, which, if completed, would require the payment of toll for its use; and

(3) that there was no overpricing because the right of way payments were based on properly certified zonal valuations; that all requirements were complied with; and that there was no participation of villar or his staff in the acquisition of the properties.

What can we make of these conflicting opinions?

A picture is worth a thousand words.

A map prepared by GMANews.TV shows what the case is all about. [See: The C5 extension controversy: An interactive map]

Here, you see the original C-5 extension project, called the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project.

The idea was that this would be a BOT project, with the private partner bearing the costs of construction, to be paid by future tolls, and the government’s exposure would be limited to P2.5 billion pesos which will be used to obtain right-of-way.

Here now is the new project.

We have super imposed the burnt orange line representing the new project again connecting SLEX to coastal road except it is very much longer and hits the coastal road farther along.

Here are the Villar properties.

On the basis of this map, it is clear that there are two alignments.

But it is also clear that one of them was unnecessary — why?

It has to be the burnt orange project, because the other project had been approved earlier.

It is also clear that the C-5 extension project is going to be more costly, first because it is longer, and second because it was built wholly with government funds; and third because of what the government spent on the road right of way for the old project will now be gone to waste.

Why will it go to waste?

Can you imagine the joint venture partner building this project which is a toll road, when a free road is almost right beside it — who will want to pay the toll?

And finally, it is very clear that the greater length of the C-5 extension project enables it to pass through all the Villar company properties — Golden Haven, Adelfa, Camella, Azalea.

There remains the issue of the overprice of the Villar properties.

Based on the documentary evidence that was presented in Senate Report 780, there were 22 properties that had to be bought to get a road right of way for the C-5 extension project.

The average price paid for the non-Villar properties was Php 2,422 per square meter.

The average price paid for of Villar properties was Php 11,519 per square meter for mostly raw land.

So, now i think we have sufficient basis, free of the posturing and screaming, to make our own decisions.

Why sugar prices are high

nospam@example.com (Winnie Monsod) — 2010-02-01T09:18:31Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on Jan. 29, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

With the growing attention on the prices of sugar, three questions have been asked:

Why are the prices of sugar going up?

Is there a need to import sugar?

Is the suggested retail price of sugar at P52/kg reasonable?

Let's take them one by one.

Why are the prices of sugar going up?

Actually, world prices of sugar have been rising since 2008, and are now the highest in 28 years, although at 30 cents per pound, they are still half of the levels they reached in 1981, which at that time was something like 60 cents per pound.

But over the past year alone, the world prices have roughly doubled. So why didn't we notice until now?

Because unlike in the case of rice or oil, sugar expenditures constitute a very small portion of the household budget.

The factors that contributed to the increase in world prices naturally have to do with a combination of demand and supply factors.

For one there has been reduced production in Brazil and India – which are two of the largest world sugar producers – due to bad weather, as well as, the diversion of sugar resources to ethanol production in the case of Brazil.

On the demand side, there is not only the growth of population, but also the stronger presence of what is called the "sweet-tooth" in consumers who are eating more candy and sweets.

As far as Philippine prices are concerned, the Sugar Regulatory Administration has mentioned the rising costs of production and the influence of the world price on mill gate prices.

And to that must be added that there has also been a not insignificant diversion of sugar resources to ethanol production, which in turn has been partly influenced by the effort to avoid agrarian reform.

Now what are the predictions with respect to world prices?

World prices will continue to rise at least up to next month.

The good news, however, it is expected that the increasing prices of sugar will encourage sugar producers to increase their production by devoting more acreage to it, diverting from other crops, and then the prices of sugar will come back down. What goes up must come down.

Second question: Do we really need to import?

There are two possible reasons for importing: One is that the volume of domestic production plus what is in stock, is less than the apparent domestic consumption or demand.

SRA Administrator Rafael Coscolluela, has stated that the production of sugar this year is actually greater than last year's production.

But what has happened – and this is really ironic – is that the increase in world prices has discouraged the smuggling of sugar into the Philippines.

It seems that the usual situation has been that world prices are lower than Philippine prices, but because of a 38 percent tariff on sugar, importing legally is too costly. So smuggling is resorted to.

But now that world prices are high, traders have turned to the domestic market.

The result is that apparent consumption, according to Coscolluela, has increased by 280,000 metric tons.

Computations made by the SRA show that while there is a current buffer stock of 300,000 metric tons to tide us over until the next harvest, the amount needed is 360,000 tons, so that there is need to import 60,000 tons.

However, if an attempt is made to control prices, all bets are off. You have to import more or there will be shortages.

Third question: Is the SRP of sugar at P52/kg reasonable?

Well, if we compare this price to the prices prevailing for example in India which is a very large producer of sugar the answer is yes because the prices in India come up to 51.50 rupees/kg which is about P52/kg in the Philippines.

If we are comparing that P52/kg with the landed price of imported sugar, including tariff, the answer is also yes because that price would be, including the retail mark up, something like P68.12/kg.

That's why, they are suggesting, if we are going to import sugar, to remove the 38 percent tariff.

Has Comelec failed to meet its own poll automation schedule?

nospam@example.com () — 2009-12-22T07:53:49Z

If one were to judge how the Comelec is doing on automation based on its original schedule of activities, Comelec would be turning in a failing performance.

According to that schedule, delivery of the PCOS – the Precinct Count Optical Scanner – machines and the systems should have taken place between Nov. 11 and Nov. 16; the testing of these systems and machines should have started on Nov. 17; the field test should have taken place on Nov. 25, and if a second field test had been deemed necessary, it should have taken place by Dec. 5, so that Mock Elections could have been held on Dec. 12.

That was the original schedule. And none of those events have taken place as yet.

Of course, we know why: problems among the contractors delayed the approval and signing of the contract, and the notice to proceed was delayed by one and a half months.

So, the Comelec prepared a revised timeline last Oct. 10, which is posted on its website.

How is it doing, if we use this timeline as a basis for judgment? I'm afraid, not so good either.

According to that schedule, delivery of 12,000 PCOS machines should have taken place by last month, and 30,000 machines this month.

Instead, after two pilot runs conducted between October 15 and Nov 14, a "pre-production" run produced 120 units, and 100 of them, which will be used as training units, will be delivered "soon" (this from an email dated Nov. 26).

But the Comelec is apparently still sanguine.

Per the ICT consultant, production would have started in earnest at the beginning of this month, and the factory in China is capable of producing 3,000 machines per shift per day –supposedly 10 minutes to produce a machine.

But then the picture is spoiled when he also says that 83,000 PCOS will be produced in less than 60 days.

Less than 60 days? Can we do the arithmetic?

If 3,000 machines can be produced per shift, then it should take either slightly more than nine days to slightly less than 14 days to produce 83 thousand units, depending on whether two or three shifts a day are being used.

You know, even if only one shift were employed, it would take slightly more than 27 days!

So why are they talking less than 60 days?

Unless of course, they expect a very large rejection rate as far as quality control is concerned. Or, the ICT consultant cannot do simple arithmetic. Either way, I am not reassured.

Unfortunately the Comelec and its partners have become very defensive, and tend to label people who ask questions as obstructionist and sourgraping – as if we don't want automated elections to succeed. Of course we do.

But the higher priority is that the elections itself must succeed – whether automated or not.

So at the risk of being called obstructionist, there are some very important questions that must be asked the Comelec:

Number 1: Given the delays in the automated election system, at what point in time is Comelec going to evaluate whether complete automation can no longer be achieved, and fall back on Plan B? And what is Plan B?

Even assuming that the automated election system pushes through, there are many more ways in which cheating can take place.

Therefore, what is Comelec doing about implementing the safeguards that it promised, and the safeguards provided for in the election law (RA 9369).

Let me just name a few of these safeguards:

a) RA 9369 provides that "Once an AES or automated election system technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof."

What is so important about a source code? Well, it is the set of instructions to the computer on its basic operations and on what to do with the election data in accordance with Philippine election laws.

Who gives the instructions? The programmer, provided by Smartmatic.

That's why those instructions should be subject to review.

b) another safeguard provided by RA 9369 is a random manual precinct audit – the election results of one precinct chosen at random in each congressional district will be tallied manually to validate the machine tally. And if there is a discrepancy (possibly indicating that the machine had been tampered with), that would signal that the rest of the precincts should be tallied manually too something is wrong.

There are other safeguards, this time promised by Comelec: that the PCOS would provide a voter verified paper trail so that the voter could be assured that his vote was recorded properly;
another safeguard the PCOS would be designed to inform the voter why his ballot was rejected, if it was rejected.

None of these safeguards have been implemented so far.

In sum, I am willing to attribute to Comelec the best of intentions. But it must also be reminded that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Arroyo has no business declaring martial law

nospam@example.com () — 2009-12-09T08:55:58Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on December 7, 2009. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

The President's declaration of martial law in Maguindanao has sparked an enormous amount of controversy.

What should we make of it?

Is she justified, or is this just another of the Administration's "baka-sakali" ("what if") moves – like declaring a state of emergency or pushing for a people's initiative or trying for a constituent assembly?

To be able to answer that, we have to break the question into its component parts.

First, under what conditions can the President declare martial law?

The answer to this question is found in Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department.

Section 18 of that article says: "The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, where the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law..."

Are we clear on that, folks?

The only time martial law can be imposed is when there is invasion or rebellion – it has got to be actually occurring – it cannot be imposed just because there is an imminent danger of one, or because one is looming.

I make this distinction because, precisely, the 1987 Constitutional Commission removed that clause “imminent danger” which was present under the 1935 Constitution, and which was used by Marcos to impose martial law.

So now that we know that the President can declare martial law only if there is invasion or rebellion, and where the public safety requires it, the logical second question is: Do these conditions exist in Maguindanao.

Let us immediately rule out invasion, of course. Is there a rebellion in Maguindanao?

To answer that, we have to first define rebellion, and here, again, it is defined specifically in our Penal Code: "The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government and its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof... depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."

So there you have it: there is a rebellion if there is a public rising and taking arms against the government to deprive the Chief Executive or the Legislature of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Now that we know what a rebellion is, the next logical question is: Is there a rebellion in Mindanao?

Obviously, the President thinks so, and in her report to the Legislature (which she is required to give within 48 hours of declaring martial law), she specifically cites 2,413 armed combatants – note the specificity of the information – coming from various municipalities, possessing 2000 firearms/armaments.

Unfortunately, the numbers cited in the report do not add up – they look like they were very hastily put together: 2,413 armed rebels is given as the total with 2000 firearms.

But if we add up the numbers deployed in different areas, they come up to only 1,460.

And then at the end of that portion, there is a sentence that says: "the strength of the rebels is itself estimated to be around 800 with about 2000 firearms."

The picture one gets is that there is a rebel force of between 800, or 1,460, or 2,413 rebels, take your pick – with 2000 firearms.

And yet, the report also proceeds to talk about the firearm caches that they discovered, a lot of them military issue – enough arms, the military says, to equip a batallion.

They were also able to confiscate ammunition and various vehicles – plus high powered firearms and ammunitions – from the 400 security escorts of Datu Andal Ampatuan Sr.; plus the other weapons turned over when there was a big show of cancelling licenses of the civilian volunteer organizations. That's the President's version of what happened.

Needless to say, aside from the inconsistencies with respect to the count of the firearms and the so-called rebels, there are other things that don't add up.

For example, before the massacre, those who carried weapons, a lot of which were military issue, had the blessings of the Chief Executive and the military, and were called Civilian Voluntary Organizations.

But barely a week after the massacre, these very same people were now labeled rebels whose objective is to remove the allegiance of their province from the central government.

What is more, despite the fact that government forces arrested 62 of their leaders, including the Ampatuan patriarch, not one of the rebels fired a shot in their defense or protection.

Nor was any attempt made to resist the Armed Forces as they entered Ampatuan mansions and property to dig up weapons and ammunition and vehicles.

Have you ever heard of a rebellion in which, after only three days, the military is already claiming victory, with nary a shot fired? Please.

All of these lead to an inescapable conclusion: Yes, there is lawless violence in Maguindanao, which was unfortunately nurtured or acquiesced to by the central government and the military.

Yes, the President as commander-in-chief should send the army there to restore law and order. No, there is no rebellion. And therefore no, the President has no business declaring martial law.

What is more, if she insists on it and there are abuses, she may truly have a rebellion on her hands.

Alternatives to the campaign tax

nospam@example.com () — 2009-11-20T10:44:15Z

As Christmas and elections approach, the taxman also cometh, and is very much in the news.

We know about Oplan Kandado, where establishments not paying their proper tax liabilities have been conspicuously padlocked – and that is a good development, because it means that the BIR is saying it means business. Nothing under the table.

The BIR is hitting tax cheats where it hurts – by temporarily closing their operations, and by exposing them to public scrutiny.

And now we have the Operation Santax Claus, which is really nothing but the stricter implementation of already existing rules and regulations on tiangge (bazaars) and other similar retail operations.

Finally, there is the campaign withholding tax plan of the BIR, where politicians and political parties are challenged to show their civic spirit by withholding 5 percent of their payments to suppliers and other campaign contractors like TV and radio stations for immediate remittance to the government.

There's nothing wrong with that in principle and, actually, it shoots two birds with one stone: it forces the politicos to also put their money where their mouths are and ensures that the government gets the tax revenues it is entitled to according to the laws these politicians themselves have passed.

It also leaves a paper trail as far as campaign expenditure reports are concerned.

Is this campaign withholding tax set to harass opposition candidates?

Is this campaign withholding tax plan some sinister plan by the administration to harass Opposition candidates?

I don't think so. It applies to all candidates, after all.

As of September 2009, the revenue shortfall is estimated to be P39 billion.

The reported revenue shortfall – the difference between actual and targeted tax revenues – is estimated to be P39 billion as of September.

How much of that will Operation Santax Claus be able to recover?

Actually nothing because the BIR doesn't expect to get anything.

They just wanted to catch into the tax base these retailers who come in for tiangge operation, etc.

So, let's go to the next one which is the campaign contribution withholding tax.

Here the BIR has a firm amount it expects to collect, but P1.4 billion is less than 5 percent of what should be raised in terms of trying to get the shortfall to close.

Are there alternative operations or Oplans that would raise more than that P1.4 billion?

The Answer is YES.

I will give two examples, both of which will raise at least P20 billion a year.

One needs legislative action, but the legislative action required is very simple. It has to do with the tax on cigarettes and tobacco.

All the legislature has to do is to change the definition of what we call "the net retail prices" that are used as the basis for determining the specific tax on cigarettes.

Currently, those net retail prices are based on October 1, 1996 retail prices.

So if you remove that October 1, 1996 retail price and you use current net retail price, you'll get P20 billion a year additional.

Can you imagine that up to now, the net retail price the BIR uses by law to determine the excise tax for a pack of cigarettes is still the net retail price 12 years ago, except for the cigarette manufacturers that started after the law was passed.

Is it any wonder Philippine cigarette taxes are practically the lowest in the world? That's P20 billion.

The second measure – which also will also yield at least P20 billion a year – is to put a stop to the smuggling of oil products in the Philippines.

How could that be achieved? It is not as hard as one
thinks.

There are measures like putting a dye in the imported oil products directed at the export zones like Subic and Phividec, supposedly for so-called "constructive exports."

If oil products being sold locally have this dye, then obviously these are smuggled.

Another measure is to check gasoline stations at random and see whether they are issuing VAT-registered receipts.

Still, another is to clamp down on the three areas that are reputed to be the main recipients of smuggled products: Subic, Phividec in Misamis Oriental, and an oil terminal in Bataan.

Still another is to accompany the ships out of these places that are supposed contain oil products for re-export until they are out of Philippine waters.

But now, the final question: Why concentrate on Santax and campaign?

If this is indeed the case, why concentrate on Santax and campaign taxes?

Answer: Because the ones paying the taxes here are the small and medium enterprises; whereas if you stop oil smuggling and use current net retail prices as base, you will be tangling with very big fish – the tax cheats and their even bigger government protectors.

Why price controls will fail

nospam@example.com () — 2009-10-16T07:01:04Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment “Analysis by Winnie Monsod” which aired on News on Q on October 13, 2009. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of New on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

A book entitled “40 Centuries of Wage and Price Controls” traces price control attempts from as far back as to the Old Testament of the Bible, to the Code of Hammurabi, to the Roman Republic and Empire, to medieval Europe, to the first centuries of the USA and Canada, to the French Revolution, the 19th century, world wars I and II, the Nazis, the Soviets, including rent controls in the US in the 1970s under Nixon and Carter.

The Philippines is no exception.

Republic Act 4164, which was passed during the Commonwealth Era, aimed to prevent excessive price increases after public calamities – which is exactly what this government is attempting to do at present, after the ravages of Ondoy and Pepeng.

Both typhoons have damaged regions that account for over 60 percent of the country's GDP, over 40 percent of our agricultural production, and close to 40 percent of our rice production.

What do the lessons of history tell us?

Have price controls over 40 centuries been successful in achieving the objective of ensuring that the poor get their basic commodities at reasonable or affordable prices?

The answer, unfortunately, is a big fat no, whether for the Philippines or anywhere else in the world.

In fact, the complete title of the book is: “40 Centuries of wage and price controls: How Not to Fight Inflation."
Not only did imposing controls not work, they also caused additional damage, such as continued shortages and crime, and the encouragement of corrupt practices.

Let us explain once again, using a market demand and supply curve to illustrate the issue.

Suppose that the demand and supply for a basic commodity, say rice, are balanced at the current price, and that the government then fixes a lower maximum price.

The quantity of rice supply will decrease because the producers – whose costs are higher than the maximum price – cannot, of course, be forced to sell their products at a loss.

In the meantime, the quantity demanded will increase. The result will be an excess in demand.

The problem will be: how are you going to allocate the limited supply to those who want to buy?

Obviously, not all who want to buy will be lucky enough to purchase the rice at the lower price – those who are ahead of the long queues, those who have connections with the sellers (maybe long-time customers), and of course, those who are willing to pay a little cash on the side.

The creation and operation of black markets would be next.

Or government could issue ration coupons, which will require additional bureaucracy with, of course, the incentives for corruption or "patronage politics" coming to the fore. This essentially means that the poor, marginalized, and unconnected are not going to be among the lucky ones.

On the part of the suppliers, the imposition of price controls provide incentives to evade those controls.
One of the simplest forms of evasion is quality deterioration.

In the Philippines, when there were price controls on paper, the quality of notebook paper and pad paper was so bad that you could not use both sides of a sheet of paper because the ink on one side would show on the other side.

Newsprint was the same way – anyone reading the newspapers had to wash their hands because the inkprint would come off onto their hands.

Of course, the excuse for price controls is that they are temporary, and will last only a very short time.

But again, history does not back up that claim.

If price controls are not the solution, what alternatives are there to make sure the poor are really being helped through hard times?

For one, one can have a program targeted specifically at the poor instead of general price controls.

Last year, when the price of rice was spiraling up, the [Department of Social Welfare and Development] had already identified households that comprised the "core poor" or the "food poor."

Why not build on that?

And have the government purchase basic commodities, either here or from abroad, and allow the poor to use their cards to qualify them to buy these commodities at subsidized prices?

That way, the price system is allowed to work, there will be less distortion in the allocation of resources, and the poor are at least assured of access to food at prices they can afford.

‘Ondoy’ brings out the best and the worst in Filipinos

nospam@example.com () — 2009-10-03T05:59:56Z

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on October 2, 2009. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

In the wake of Typhoon Ondoy, the latest reports show that at least 246 people have died, with 37 still unaccounted for; one in every 11 families in Metro Manila and Central Luzon were affected by the flood, with over 567,000 people still crowded in evacuation centers.

Property damage has been assessed at at least P4.67 billion. And no one has yet tried to estimate the loss in economic productivity as well as losses from dislocation.

No one questions that Ondoy was a natural calamity. But the damage wrought cannot be wholly attributed to nature alone.

Human acts and omissions contributed substantially to that damage, and must not be exculpated.

To wit:

PAGASA has equipment that will allow it to detect, among others, the wind velocity of tropical cyclones and their possible path.

What PAGASA still does not have — which is available — is the equipment, called Doppler radar, which, I am informed, allows the rain content of such storms to be determined as well — and therefore the intensity of flooding that might occur.

The irony of it is that this Doppler radar costs — and I got this from Google — a mere $300,000 to $1 million, or roughly P15 million to P50 million pesos.

Why “mere”? Because it is much less than the P70 million that is reportedly the yearly pork barrel allocation of a single congressman, and peanuts compared to a Senator’s annual P200 million share of that same pork.

Or how about comparing it to the cost of a Presidential foreign trip?

The cost per day of her trips two years ago (2007) came out to $255,000 from $46,000 thousand a day in 2002.

It is safe to say that by $2009, these trips average about $300,000 a day.

Therefore the Doppler radar would cost be roughly equal to anywhere from one day’s to a little over three days’ foreign travel of the President.

In any case, it would pay for itself almost immediately, in terms of the number of the number of lives saved, and property damage reduced.

Yes, PAGASA did issue flood and landslide warnings as early as September 24 – but saying that there may be flood and landslides is a different kettle of fish then saying something to the effect that “400 centimeters of rain is expected in the next ten hours — more than the average rainfall in a whole month.”

That will surely catch everyone’s attention, including the authorities.

In early August of this year, the state of Kentucky experienced its version of Ondoy, with more rain falling in one day than was normal for the month (actually Kentucky had worse experience — there was also lightning caused fires as well as hailstones).

But the authorities and the people were properly forewarned, so that while property damage was extensive, there were no deaths (except for nine animals in an animal shelter which was flooded).

Then you have the NDCC, which not only seemed to have ignored PAGASA’s warnings, but also seemed clueless as to what areas to prioritize as for rescue operations, depending — again seemingly — only on the texts that were coming in. This has to be inexcusable.

Architect Jun Palafox, who has an MA in environmental planning, informs us that as early as 1977 — or 32 years ago — the Metro Manila Transport, Land Use and Development Planning Project, funded by the World Bank, already identified the areas in Metro Manila that were vulnerable to massive flooding, probably because they were natural basins.

He should know.

He was part of that report, working for the DPWH under then Minister Dave Consunji, one of the best, if not the best DPWH heads we have had.

By the way, that report singled out Marikina Valley as problematic.

If this information had been an input to the NDCC plans, the boats should have and could have been transported to those specific areas as soon as the flood warnings were sounded, instead of waiting until the floods were upon us before starting the deployment.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

And so we had the spectacle of the Army and Coast Guard boats, 25 from the army and 18 from the Coast Guard, unable to be deployed to the areas where the floods were at their highest or their most dangerous, because by then, the roads were impassable with stalled cars.

The rescue teams from Subic could not reach Manila promptly either, for mostly the same reasons.

Which brings us to the third factor in a man-made disaster scenario.

We all saw terrible scenes of stalled cars on the roads, some being carried away by the force of the current.

But there is another angle to that.

In Marikina, for example, car owners, in their effort to keep their cars from being flooded, brought them to higher ground and parked them there.

The higher ground, unfortunately, happened to be the main thoroughfares — as in Bonifacio Avenue leading to Marikina.

What happened then was that cars on the road that wanted to go the sides to wait out the floods had no side to go to. So they stopped (or were stalled) in the middle of the road.

Which brought traffic to a complete standstill — and then prevented rescue operations from being undertaken.

And speaking of the public, there may have been some excuse for not listening to PAGASAs flood warnings on September 24 — how many times, after all, has PAGASA made the wrong call? — but there was no longer any excuse for not heeding the call of the local government executives — Marides Fernando of Marikina, for one, who asked sent out evacuation notices, asking the people to move to higher ground, because the Marikina dike was already in danger of being breached.

It may have been already too late for some; it also could have been that the barangay executives did not do their job well; but for others, the warning was heard, but not heeded.

They preferred to stay at home. Even when they were being rescued, they signaled that they would rather stay, at home, and just asked for food to be dropped to them.

And why? This is the most tragic part of all:

Because they were afraid to leave their possessions behind, afraid that these would be looted or robbed — they had no faith in the ability of government to provide security.

And a lot of those that did leave were — you guessed it — indeed looted and robbed.

Ondoy brought out the best — and the worst — in our people.

What can be done to reduce the man-made part of this disaster?

Well, as far as the PAGASA equipment is concerned, this is already being addressed by a bill that has already passed the Senate, sponsored by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon and cosponsored by Loren Legarda — called the Disaster Risk Reduction Act of 2009.

One has, however, no idea when the House version will be passed.

With regard to better disaster planning, apparently Sen. Gringo Honasan is sponsoring SB 1444 that replaces the present disaster mitigation procedures with one that is not so much focused on response as on prevention.

But our lack of faith in both national and local government, and — dare I say it? — our desire to look out for ourselves first, ignoring the spillover effects (just think of the humongous traffic snarls caused by counterflowers) is something that each of us has to face, and resolve.

We get the government, and the traffic jams, that we deserve.