(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on Feb. 22, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

That Comelec is the center of attention at this time is not surprising. The May elections are fast approaching.

But the nature of that attention is another matter altogether, focused as it is on the credibility of the Comelec as an institution.

A joint House-Senate Committee chaired by Chiz Escudero and TeddyBoy Locsin has been showing concern about the Comelec's ability to handle an automated election .

In particular, the problem of delays in the Comelec's schedule — delivery delays, training delays, deployment delays, the problem of security, and the obvious lack of a back-up or contingency plan that can be activated in case something goes wrong with the machines, or something is shown to be wrong with those machines, these all have been haunting Comelec officials as well as our legislators — who got cold feet after appropriating P11 billion for Comelec's activities.

But that is not the only reason why attention is focused on the Comelec.

Quite apart from the problems of automation, there is the problem also of the Comelec decisions with regard to election protests, particularly those emanating from the Second Division, which for quite some time now has been the subject of rumors and speculation, and has gained notoriety among election lawyers.

This Second Division, composed of Nicodemo Ferrer as head, and Elios Yusoph and Lucenito Tagle as members, have handed down three very controversial decisions in which incumbent governors have been declared losers and asked to step down from their positions: the governors of Bulacan, Isabela and Pampanga.

What has captured the public's attention is not that a decision was made — resolving election protests are after all a primary responsibility of the Comelec.

It is not even suprising anymore that the length of time that it takes the Comelec to make a decision is almost the length of time of the term of office of the contested position — which is three years for every office except those of Senators, and the President and Vice President.

Rather, what has captured the public's attention, and possibly outrage, are the identities of those who, in effect, have been accused of cheating.

Yes, let's call a spade a spade here.

Because when someone is unseated, the default scenario is that he must have cheated to win in the first place. Or to look at it from another point of view, declaring someone a winner three years after elections took place is practically the same thing as saying that that person had been cheated, and the Comelec is just making things right.

The only problem is that in at least the Isabela and Pampanga cases, the public is incredulous about the implication of cheating on the part of the sitting governors, and instead suspects foul play on the part of, or with the consent of, the Comelec's Second Division.

Let's take a closer look at two of the cases, involving the provinces of Isabela and Pampanga.

Who were in effect found to have cheated? Grace Padaca in Isabela, and Ed Panlilio in Pampanga.

One was a radio commentator, the other a priest.

Neither of them have money, neither of them had political machinery — both of them were novatos — new to the political world.

And to cheat successfully in the Philippines, as we saw in a recent analysis, you need guns and goons, or gold. You need private armies, or you need the money to bribe either voters or counters.

Neither of which neither Padaca nor Panlilio had. They had volunteers who gave of their time and effort to help.

And yet, what did the Comelec's second division find?

In the case of Padaca, the Comelec managed to find enough evidence of cheating to overcome the 17,000 vote lead of Padaca, and make her opponent win 1,051 votes. That takes some doing, and it took Comelec 12,000 pages to do it, including, in some parts of the decision, referring to Padaca as Sarmiento, and to her opponent Dy as Tuazon.

In the case of Panlilio, not only did the Comelec's second division turn down his request for more time to raise funds for paying the costs of the case, but they seemed to have a strong desire to speed up the counting by allowing twenty teams of revisors at the same time instead of only the usual nine — and of course, that required even more funding than the usual.

Thus, Panlilio was left with only one revisor for every three that his opponent had — with the blessings of the Comelec's Second Division, who scoffed at Panlilio's plea, and asked him to use the "volunteers" he claimed to have had.

But there also seems to be more overt bias on the part of the Comelec Second Division.

Such as in the Isabela case, the name Faustino Dy was credited to Benjamin Dy for governor, while the names Gris Padaca or Grace Padacca, with a double c, was not credited to Padaca.

In the Pampanga case, the name Nanay Baby was credited to Panlilio's rival, but the names Ed and Among were not allowed to be credited to Panlilio.

And that's how Panlilio's slim lead of over a thousand votes vanished, and his rival won instead by over 2,000 votes.

With that kind of decision-making process going on in Comelec, is it any wonder that it is fast losing whatever credibility it had?

For shame.

(Following is the transcript of the segment “Analysis by Winnie Monsod” which aired on News on Q on February 8, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 PM on Channel 11.)

As we draw nearer to election day, so many issues are cropping up that catch the public's attention – particularly those dealing with the success or failure of automated elections.

Let us make sure, however, that we do not miss the forest for the trees.

As Article II, Section 1 of our Constitution says, sovereignty resides in the people, and all government authority emanates from them.

This sovereignty is exercised by means of suffrage – which is the right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote for their national and local officials, as well as in the decision of public questions submitted to them.

The election involves voting and then counting (and canvassing), and if these two procedures go well, then, the people's choice will indeed come out.

But there is a problem.

Even as the people express their will through the ballot, that expression can – and has been –subverted many times.

When and how can this subversion take place?

At two points during the election process: During the voting, and during the counting/canvassing, that's when.

And how? The expression “guns, goons, and gold” says it all.

The subversion can be accomplished either by force – "guns and goons"; or by bribery – "gold"; or some combination of both.

The guns and goons are the private armies, which have been part of the Philippine scene for at least the past 60 years, and have figured tragically and prominently in elections.

What else do we know about private armies?

1. They operate with the blessings, or the active participation of military and police elements, which in turn may be because of the explicit or implicit blessings of Malacañang.

Take the case of Negros Occidental governor Rafael Lacson, circa 1951, who reputedly had a 1,000-man private army and claimed closeness to the President Elpidio Quirino, claiming to have been instrumental in quirino's election.

Governor Lacson was enraged when a guerilla fighter, Moises Padilla defied him and ran for mayor.

Even though Padilla lost the election, he was arrested on trumped-up charges, beaten, tortured, and paraded around the towns of Negros Occidental as an object lesson of what happens when you defy the governor, and then he was shot.

That is eerily similar to the case, almost 60 years later, of Maguindanao Governor Andal Ampatuan, who claimed closeness to Malacañang, who reputedly has at least a 1000-man private army with control over the police, who was indeed instrumental in the election of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Presidency, and who was displeased because Toto Mangudadatu defied him and filed his certificate of candidacy to run for governor.

That's how the maguindanao massacre took place.

2. Poverty and private armies seem to go hand in hand – the poorer the area, the larger the number and the size of the private armies.

Take the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

It is the region with the highest incidence of poverty in the Philippines, and probably the lowest human development index.

The latest military and police report states that of an estimated 170 private armies all over the Philippines, 102 (60 percent) are located in ARMM.

3. There seems to be if not active cooperation, at least complicity by the police and military when it comes to private armies.

In the Moises Padilla case, Governor Lacson's co-defendants included three police chiefs, several policemen, and some special policemen. And of course, also in Maguindanao.

4. Indeed private armies can be dismantled – but it requires determination, like that showed by President Ramon Magsaysay and President Cory Aquino.

In fact, between 1993 and today, it would seem that the number of private armies has decreased from 562 to 170 or 132, depending on whether we accept the Army’s or [Defense Secretary] Bert Gonzales’ figures.

But the size of private armies, however, seems to have increased – from an average of about 43 to an average of 76.

If these armies are not dismantled, not even a perfectly operating automated election system can guarantee that the sovereign will of the people in their choice of leaders from the president to the lowest local officials will be obeyed.

The guns and goons operating in certain areas may be sufficient to change the real vote of the people.

In sum, we have to be vigilant with respect to automated elections.

But, we must also demand that the army and the police dismantle these private armies if our elections are going to be truly free.

(Following is the transcript of the segment “Analysis by Winnie Monsod” which aired on News on Q on Feb. 1, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on QTV Channel 11.)

What are the specific charges against Senator Manny Villar?

Based on the Senate Report 780, stripped of all the legalese, the charges are that he used his position and influence to cause a government roadway — the so-called C-5 road extension project — to be built and that the road was unnecessary, financially disadvantageous to the government, and would actually yield him enormous financial benefits.

It was unnecessary, because there was already an existing project, the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway (MCTEP), which was a Build-Operate-Transfer project to be built by private contractors.

It was financially disadvantageous to the government because the Villar-proposed project would be longer and would be built entirely by the government using public funds.

And it would result in tremendous financial benefit for Villar because it would pass right through his properties so that the government would have to pay him road right-of-way and at the same time, considerably enhance the value of those properties.

What exacerbates the situation is that the government, per the documentary evidence, paid much more for the right-of-way for the Villar properties than the other properties, that Villar allegedly used his position as a senator — in particular as the Senate Finance Chairman and then as Senate President — to make insertions that would ensure that his properties would be paid for right away.

Based on the Philippine Senate resolution 1472 filed by mostly Villar allies, the committee of the whole had no jurisdiction, that it adopted rules that were inapplicable, that it did not even publish the final rules, that there was an inadequate quorum reuirement; and most importantly, that Manny Villar was being singled out.

What does it then find?

Resolution 1472 finds that:

(1) there was no “double insertion” and that the same were actually “regular amendments”;

(2) that there is no realignment of the C-5 road extension project, much less one authored or done at the behest of senator Villar to secure that it passed through his real estate properties.

Why? Because there are two separate alignments: one is the C-5 road extension project, which is a public road; and the other is the MCTEP, a toll expressway project, which, if completed, would require the payment of toll for its use; and

(3) that there was no overpricing because the right of way payments were based on properly certified zonal valuations; that all requirements were complied with; and that there was no participation of villar or his staff in the acquisition of the properties.

What can we make of these conflicting opinions?

A picture is worth a thousand words.

A map prepared by GMANews.TV shows what the case is all about. [See: The C5 extension controversy: An interactive map]

Here, you see the original C-5 extension project, called the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project.

The idea was that this would be a BOT project, with the private partner bearing the costs of construction, to be paid by future tolls, and the government’s exposure would be limited to P2.5 billion pesos which will be used to obtain right-of-way.

Here now is the new project.

We have super imposed the burnt orange line representing the new project again connecting SLEX to coastal road except it is very much longer and hits the coastal road farther along.

Here are the Villar properties.

On the basis of this map, it is clear that there are two alignments.

But it is also clear that one of them was unnecessary — why?

It has to be the burnt orange project, because the other project had been approved earlier.

It is also clear that the C-5 extension project is going to be more costly, first because it is longer, and second because it was built wholly with government funds; and third because of what the government spent on the road right of way for the old project will now be gone to waste.

Why will it go to waste?

Can you imagine the joint venture partner building this project which is a toll road, when a free road is almost right beside it — who will want to pay the toll?

And finally, it is very clear that the greater length of the C-5 extension project enables it to pass through all the Villar company properties — Golden Haven, Adelfa, Camella, Azalea.

There remains the issue of the overprice of the Villar properties.

Based on the documentary evidence that was presented in Senate Report 780, there were 22 properties that had to be bought to get a road right of way for the C-5 extension project.

The average price paid for the non-Villar properties was Php 2,422 per square meter.

The average price paid for of Villar properties was Php 11,519 per square meter for mostly raw land.

So, now i think we have sufficient basis, free of the posturing and screaming, to make our own decisions.

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on Jan. 29, 2010. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

With the growing attention on the prices of sugar, three questions have been asked:

Why are the prices of sugar going up?

Is there a need to import sugar?

Is the suggested retail price of sugar at P52/kg reasonable?

Let's take them one by one.

Why are the prices of sugar going up?

Actually, world prices of sugar have been rising since 2008, and are now the highest in 28 years, although at 30 cents per pound, they are still half of the levels they reached in 1981, which at that time was something like 60 cents per pound.

But over the past year alone, the world prices have roughly doubled. So why didn't we notice until now?

Because unlike in the case of rice or oil, sugar expenditures constitute a very small portion of the household budget.

The factors that contributed to the increase in world prices naturally have to do with a combination of demand and supply factors.

For one there has been reduced production in Brazil and India – which are two of the largest world sugar producers – due to bad weather, as well as, the diversion of sugar resources to ethanol production in the case of Brazil.

On the demand side, there is not only the growth of population, but also the stronger presence of what is called the "sweet-tooth" in consumers who are eating more candy and sweets.

As far as Philippine prices are concerned, the Sugar Regulatory Administration has mentioned the rising costs of production and the influence of the world price on mill gate prices.

And to that must be added that there has also been a not insignificant diversion of sugar resources to ethanol production, which in turn has been partly influenced by the effort to avoid agrarian reform.

Now what are the predictions with respect to world prices?

World prices will continue to rise at least up to next month.

The good news, however, it is expected that the increasing prices of sugar will encourage sugar producers to increase their production by devoting more acreage to it, diverting from other crops, and then the prices of sugar will come back down. What goes up must come down.

Second question: Do we really need to import?

There are two possible reasons for importing: One is that the volume of domestic production plus what is in stock, is less than the apparent domestic consumption or demand.

SRA Administrator Rafael Coscolluela, has stated that the production of sugar this year is actually greater than last year's production.

But what has happened – and this is really ironic – is that the increase in world prices has discouraged the smuggling of sugar into the Philippines.

It seems that the usual situation has been that world prices are lower than Philippine prices, but because of a 38 percent tariff on sugar, importing legally is too costly. So smuggling is resorted to.

But now that world prices are high, traders have turned to the domestic market.

The result is that apparent consumption, according to Coscolluela, has increased by 280,000 metric tons.

Computations made by the SRA show that while there is a current buffer stock of 300,000 metric tons to tide us over until the next harvest, the amount needed is 360,000 tons, so that there is need to import 60,000 tons.

However, if an attempt is made to control prices, all bets are off. You have to import more or there will be shortages.

Third question: Is the SRP of sugar at P52/kg reasonable?

Well, if we compare this price to the prices prevailing for example in India which is a very large producer of sugar the answer is yes because the prices in India come up to 51.50 rupees/kg which is about P52/kg in the Philippines.

If we are comparing that P52/kg with the landed price of imported sugar, including tariff, the answer is also yes because that price would be, including the retail mark up, something like P68.12/kg.

That's why, they are suggesting, if we are going to import sugar, to remove the 38 percent tariff.