If one were to judge how the Comelec is doing on automation based on its original schedule of activities, Comelec would be turning in a failing performance.

According to that schedule, delivery of the PCOS – the Precinct Count Optical Scanner – machines and the systems should have taken place between Nov. 11 and Nov. 16; the testing of these systems and machines should have started on Nov. 17; the field test should have taken place on Nov. 25, and if a second field test had been deemed necessary, it should have taken place by Dec. 5, so that Mock Elections could have been held on Dec. 12.

That was the original schedule. And none of those events have taken place as yet.

Of course, we know why: problems among the contractors delayed the approval and signing of the contract, and the notice to proceed was delayed by one and a half months.

So, the Comelec prepared a revised timeline last Oct. 10, which is posted on its website.

How is it doing, if we use this timeline as a basis for judgment? I'm afraid, not so good either.

According to that schedule, delivery of 12,000 PCOS machines should have taken place by last month, and 30,000 machines this month.

Instead, after two pilot runs conducted between October 15 and Nov 14, a "pre-production" run produced 120 units, and 100 of them, which will be used as training units, will be delivered "soon" (this from an email dated Nov. 26).

But the Comelec is apparently still sanguine.

Per the ICT consultant, production would have started in earnest at the beginning of this month, and the factory in China is capable of producing 3,000 machines per shift per day –supposedly 10 minutes to produce a machine.

But then the picture is spoiled when he also says that 83,000 PCOS will be produced in less than 60 days.

Less than 60 days? Can we do the arithmetic?

If 3,000 machines can be produced per shift, then it should take either slightly more than nine days to slightly less than 14 days to produce 83 thousand units, depending on whether two or three shifts a day are being used.

You know, even if only one shift were employed, it would take slightly more than 27 days!

So why are they talking less than 60 days?

Unless of course, they expect a very large rejection rate as far as quality control is concerned. Or, the ICT consultant cannot do simple arithmetic. Either way, I am not reassured.

Unfortunately the Comelec and its partners have become very defensive, and tend to label people who ask questions as obstructionist and sourgraping – as if we don't want automated elections to succeed. Of course we do.

But the higher priority is that the elections itself must succeed – whether automated or not.

So at the risk of being called obstructionist, there are some very important questions that must be asked the Comelec:

Number 1: Given the delays in the automated election system, at what point in time is Comelec going to evaluate whether complete automation can no longer be achieved, and fall back on Plan B? And what is Plan B?

Even assuming that the automated election system pushes through, there are many more ways in which cheating can take place.

Therefore, what is Comelec doing about implementing the safeguards that it promised, and the safeguards provided for in the election law (RA 9369).

Let me just name a few of these safeguards:

a) RA 9369 provides that "Once an AES or automated election system technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof."

What is so important about a source code? Well, it is the set of instructions to the computer on its basic operations and on what to do with the election data in accordance with Philippine election laws.

Who gives the instructions? The programmer, provided by Smartmatic.

That's why those instructions should be subject to review.

b) another safeguard provided by RA 9369 is a random manual precinct audit – the election results of one precinct chosen at random in each congressional district will be tallied manually to validate the machine tally. And if there is a discrepancy (possibly indicating that the machine had been tampered with), that would signal that the rest of the precincts should be tallied manually too something is wrong.

There are other safeguards, this time promised by Comelec: that the PCOS would provide a voter verified paper trail so that the voter could be assured that his vote was recorded properly;
another safeguard the PCOS would be designed to inform the voter why his ballot was rejected, if it was rejected.

None of these safeguards have been implemented so far.

In sum, I am willing to attribute to Comelec the best of intentions. But it must also be reminded that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

(Following is the transcript of the segment "Analysis by Winnie Monsod" which aired on News on Q on December 7, 2009. Prof. Winnie Monsod is the resident analyst of News on Q which airs weeknights at 9:30 p.m. on Q Channel 11.)

The President's declaration of martial law in Maguindanao has sparked an enormous amount of controversy.

What should we make of it?

Is she justified, or is this just another of the Administration's "baka-sakali" ("what if") moves – like declaring a state of emergency or pushing for a people's initiative or trying for a constituent assembly?

To be able to answer that, we have to break the question into its component parts.

First, under what conditions can the President declare martial law?

The answer to this question is found in Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department.

Section 18 of that article says: "The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, where the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law..."

Are we clear on that, folks?

The only time martial law can be imposed is when there is invasion or rebellion – it has got to be actually occurring – it cannot be imposed just because there is an imminent danger of one, or because one is looming.

I make this distinction because, precisely, the 1987 Constitutional Commission removed that clause “imminent danger” which was present under the 1935 Constitution, and which was used by Marcos to impose martial law.

So now that we know that the President can declare martial law only if there is invasion or rebellion, and where the public safety requires it, the logical second question is: Do these conditions exist in Maguindanao.

Let us immediately rule out invasion, of course. Is there a rebellion in Maguindanao?

To answer that, we have to first define rebellion, and here, again, it is defined specifically in our Penal Code: "The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government and its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof... depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."

So there you have it: there is a rebellion if there is a public rising and taking arms against the government to deprive the Chief Executive or the Legislature of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Now that we know what a rebellion is, the next logical question is: Is there a rebellion in Mindanao?

Obviously, the President thinks so, and in her report to the Legislature (which she is required to give within 48 hours of declaring martial law), she specifically cites 2,413 armed combatants – note the specificity of the information – coming from various municipalities, possessing 2000 firearms/armaments.

Unfortunately, the numbers cited in the report do not add up – they look like they were very hastily put together: 2,413 armed rebels is given as the total with 2000 firearms.

But if we add up the numbers deployed in different areas, they come up to only 1,460.

And then at the end of that portion, there is a sentence that says: "the strength of the rebels is itself estimated to be around 800 with about 2000 firearms."

The picture one gets is that there is a rebel force of between 800, or 1,460, or 2,413 rebels, take your pick – with 2000 firearms.

And yet, the report also proceeds to talk about the firearm caches that they discovered, a lot of them military issue – enough arms, the military says, to equip a batallion.

They were also able to confiscate ammunition and various vehicles – plus high powered firearms and ammunitions – from the 400 security escorts of Datu Andal Ampatuan Sr.; plus the other weapons turned over when there was a big show of cancelling licenses of the civilian volunteer organizations. That's the President's version of what happened.

Needless to say, aside from the inconsistencies with respect to the count of the firearms and the so-called rebels, there are other things that don't add up.

For example, before the massacre, those who carried weapons, a lot of which were military issue, had the blessings of the Chief Executive and the military, and were called Civilian Voluntary Organizations.

But barely a week after the massacre, these very same people were now labeled rebels whose objective is to remove the allegiance of their province from the central government.

What is more, despite the fact that government forces arrested 62 of their leaders, including the Ampatuan patriarch, not one of the rebels fired a shot in their defense or protection.

Nor was any attempt made to resist the Armed Forces as they entered Ampatuan mansions and property to dig up weapons and ammunition and vehicles.

Have you ever heard of a rebellion in which, after only three days, the military is already claiming victory, with nary a shot fired? Please.

All of these lead to an inescapable conclusion: Yes, there is lawless violence in Maguindanao, which was unfortunately nurtured or acquiesced to by the central government and the military.

Yes, the President as commander-in-chief should send the army there to restore law and order. No, there is no rebellion. And therefore no, the President has no business declaring martial law.

What is more, if she insists on it and there are abuses, she may truly have a rebellion on her hands.