Ten years ago on March 21st, former President Joseph Estrada declared the all-out war policy against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The alleged basis for the said policy was the occupation of the Narciso Ramos highway by the MILF, which was a direct affront to the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] and the Republic of the Philippines.

Prior to this declaration, the peace panels of both the GRP [Government of the Republic of the Philippines] and the MILF were trying to craft a win-win formula that would be satisfactory to both protagonists.

On the 20th of March, 2000, they came up with a solution that would entail the repositioning of the MILF forces about two kilometers away from the length of the Narciso Ramos Highway and the PNP would be in charge of the checkpoints along the said highway.

The formula was never tried.

On the early morning of the 21st, the AFP mounted ground and aerial assaults against all the MILF positions along the Narciso Ramos Highway.

It was a bloody war that was characterized by rituals of flag raising and feasting at every MILF camp bombed and taken by the AFP.

Hundreds of thousands were displaced as the ugly face of war unfolded.

The gap between the protagonists deepened and the destruction simply galvanized the will to continue the fight.

The all-out war policy never solves the problem of the MILF.

The Estrada War displaced the MILF from their camps but it never wrote ‘finis’ to the Moro fighters. In fact, the MILF simply withdrew from their camps and went deeper into the forests and the Liguasan Marsh.

The all-out war is a ‘quick fix’ by the Estrada administration to the MILF issue.

Yet, lessons from past engagements tell that in any war of insurgency, there is no such thing as a ‘quick fix’ or a ‘short cut’ solution.

A lasting peace among major protagonists is never won by war.

Peace is a product of long and participative negotiation that leads to a political settlement that is owned by the major stakeholders.

There is no such thing as a quick fix to the problem of insurgency.

There is no such thing also as ‘instant’ agreement to provide solution to a problem that involves not only of insurgency but also of shattered social cohesion over deeply contested issues like ancestral domain and self-determination.

It is rather weird that as we behold the futility and insanity of the all-out war policy declared by former Estrada ten years ago, the same guy who now aspires to become President of the Republic continues to mouth the same old policy as the cornerstone of his peace agenda.

He thought then the war policy actually boosted his acceptance rating in the year 2000 when his government was becoming infamous for his notorious midnight cabinet meetings and houses of his many spouses.

I dread that the same thought does enter his mind.

His tough stand and his openly declared all-out war policy vis-à-vis the MILF make him a real ‘macho’ to court the votes of the so-called war constituency and the people who believe in instant solution.

Sometimes, it has hard to believe that people believe that an all-out war policy is a solution to the problem in Mindanao.

But strangely enough, there are people who root for the candidates who espouse the said doctrine. They actually believe that by killing all the insurgents and burn all their camps, peace would ensue.

The problems of insurgency, whether MNLF or MILF or NDF, are rooted not on warriors that come and go, but on valid and legitimate grievances.

Political settlements through peace negotiations seek to address these grievances without creating new ones.

In the world, there are many long and protracted peace processes.

Foremost is the Israel-Palestinian question.

In fact, the lack of any progress in the said peace process is cited as one of the basis for the growing extremism in Islam.

Can the same be said in Southern Philippines?

The mainstream Muslim population and the two liberations fronts that seek to be their ‘guardians’ belong to moderate Islam.

The so-called extremists like al-Qaeda, ASG [Abu Sayyaf Group] and JI [Jemaah Islamiyah] are the minority though often they do hijack the media hook, line, and sinker.

It is refreshing to remember that the vast majority of Muslims in the South and the North and everywhere in the world are moderates.

They eke out a daily living and try hard to send their kids to good schools. They desire to live in peace like any decent family regardless of ethnicity and religion.

The real fear comes when this moderate block becomes agitated by a policy like all-out war. It is a policy that is best described as narrow, shallow, and hollow!

But in reality, the whole persona of Erap and his program of governance echo the same description.

Ten years ago, the whole nation was a victim of the narrow, shallow, and hollow all-out war policy.

Come May 10 elections, we hope that the electorate has learned their lessons.

God forbid that Mindanao would see yet another bout of an all-out war policy!

The possible break-up in the GRP-MILF [Government of the Republic of the Philippines-Moro Islamic Liberation Front] Peace Talks is a very real option as can be gleaned in the great divide that separates their positions.

The only positive thing is the fact that both the GRP and the MILF Peace Panels recognize the limitations of the ‘expiring’ Arroyo Administration.

The Philippine government has drawn the parameters that outline what are the realistic and achievable goals for the remaining four or five months of the Arroyo Presidency.

The government’s offer consists of what is now referred as ‘executive doables’ to mean actions or ‘deliverables’ within the existing laws.

These laws are the following: (1) RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM; (2) the IPRA; and the Local Government Code.

On the other hand, the MILF tends to adhere to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA AD) that was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

The Philippine Government has clearly articulated that it can no longer negotiate an agreement that would require (1) legislative action and (2) Constitutional Change.

The only things the present Arroyo Administration can do in the next four months are actionable agreements within the powers granted by existing laws.

On the other hand, the MILF has also articulated its position that the present peace negotiation would require not only legislative actions but also Constitutional change.

However, the MILF also sees that neither Constitutional change nor legislative actions is possible under the ‘expiring’ administration.

With this realistic appreciation of the limitations of the present Arroyo dispensation, a comprehensive peace agreement between the GRP and the MILF is NO longer possible.

It is not also wise to enter in any agreement that the next administration would simply repudiate.

Any such move is counter-productive and harmful in the long run.

The best option is to explore the maximum ‘executive doables’ within the existing laws with the understanding that these actions would serve as ‘confidence building’ measures.

Good and immediately deliverable executive actions will, definitely, create the appropriate climate for the continuing peace talks.

Moreover, the trust built would bridge the peace talks from the expiring administration to the new one comes June 30th.

At this stage, neither the GRP Panel nor the MILF Panel expects a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Both Peace Panels hope, however, to consolidate the two new agreements: (1) the Agreement on the Civilian Protection and (2) the Agreement on the ‘International Contact Group (ICG).

With the renewal of the Term of Reference (TOR) of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and locating it within the principle of civilian protection, everybody, including the panels, believe that the gap between the positions need not lead a new eruption of hostility.

If there would be a breakdown in the peace talks due to the wide gap between the two positions, the worst possible scenario (God forbid!) is the resumption of hostility with ensuing military encounters.

But this need not happen, because the cost of war is daunting on both sides.

Both in human and development terms, another major war and displacement are not tenable.

The two new agreements with the renewed mechanisms (CCCH [Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities], IMT and ICG) put real pressure on both the GRP and the MILF to recognize and respect Human Rights Law and the International Humanitarian Law.

The so-called ‘collateral damage’ is a military doctrine that is now rejected in the community of nations.

Soldiers and rebels need to engage in ethical rules of engagement that provide security and safety to non combatants.

The likelihood to happen in the absence of any agreement is the status of ‘no peace and no war’.

The status quo means allowing the ceasefire agreement and the mechanisms of ceasefire to work while waiting for a new government.

The best scenario is to seize the moment, that is, the next five months to consolidate the gains of the ongoing peace talks and put the peace negotiation in a more solid basis by focusing on the ‘executive doables’ allowed by the existing laws.

There are many immediately ‘doables’ that the existing laws already allow.

But this to come true needs an executive political will and a real commitment to the peace process beyond rhetoric.

Definitely, these ‘doables’ would inspire trust and confidence in the talks.

RA 9054, IPRA and the Local Government Code contain so many executive ‘doables’ that will build not only a good climate for the on-going talks but also uplift the poor conditions of the ARMM constituents.

In the final analysis, this commitment is the single crucial issue that the GRP and the MILF need to face in this period of transition from one administration to another.